Fisheries cooperatives play an important role in Mexico, given that they are capable of generating employment,
supplying food, stimulating local commerce, and promoting democracy and social integration in the communities where they
operate. Fisheries production cooperatives form part of a sector called the social economy. Nevertheless, like all organizations,
they face problems in terms of management, worker relations, rule implementation, and continuance over time. The aim of this
study is to analyze and identify the degree of influence that exists between the informal constraints of fisheries production
cooperatives (specifically in the form of institutional routines and incentives) and compliance with their doctrinal principles.
This study uses a non-experimental quantitative, cross-sectional, correlational-explanatory approach. The research methods
consisted of the construction of associated indices, descriptive statistics, correlation analysis and multiple linear regression
analysis. Three hypotheses were proposed. With regard to H1, the results showed that informal constraints in the form of
routines are moderately correlated with the level of compliance with the formal rules. Regarding the results for H2, it was
confirmed that informal constraints in the form of incentives are very weakly correlated with the level of compliance with the
formal rules. And with regard to H3, based on a joint analysis of the variables, only routines significantly influenced
compliance with these doctrinal principles. Based on the above, it was concluded that routines and not incentives are the
factors that exert the greatest influence on compliance with the doctrinal principles of cooperatives.
